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How do employee stock options affect the economic value of firms and the welfare
of the general stockholders? This article explains how these instruments work and
why shareholders should have better information about them.
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Corporate governance and executive
compensation have recently come under
increased public and legislative scrutiny.
The use of stock options to motivate and
reward employees, and executives in par-
ticular, has been a major focus of this de-
bate. While executive stock options have
gained the most attention, employee
stock options are also of concern, since
broad-based employee stock option plans
may be far larger than executive stock
option grants. These concerns have led
to demands for greater transparency of
employee and executive stock option pro-
grams, and to counter-arguments that
changes in their accounting treatment
are not needed or may be harmful.1
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I explore the im-
pact of employee stock options on the
economic value of the firm and the wel-
fare of the general stockholders.2 Viewed
from this perspective, employee stock
options represent a real wealth transfer
from the firm to the employees at the ex-
pense of other stockholders. Where the
number of outstanding stock options is
large, for instance at firms with broad-
based employee stock option plans, the
value of the wealth transfer can materially
impact the stockholders’ claims. I argue
that this transfer should be made trans-
parent to the stockholders and show how
this can be done. For firms with limited
executive stock option plans, transparency
as to the value of wealth being transferred
to executives is critical to stockholder mon-
itoring of executive compensation, even
if the aggregate numbers involved are
small relative to the total value of the firm.
Employee stock options are rights to pur-
chase shares at a specified price, the strike
price, on or before a given date. This is
termed an American “call option.” If the
price of the stock rises above the strike
price on or before the expiry date, the
holder of the call option can purchase
the stock at the strike price and resell it
at the higher market price, pocketing the
difference. Unlike traded options, em-
ployee stock options are issued by com-
panies directly to senior management or
to key employees. When an employee
stock option is exercised, the firm sells
shares to the employee at the strike price.
These shares can either be newly issued
shares or old shares previously repur-
chased by the firm and held as “treasury
stock.” The employee can then sell the
shares on the market to realize the dif-
ference between the stock price and the
strike price. A variation on the employee
stock option, called a stock appreciation
right (SAR), avoids the issuance/sale of
stock by paying the employee the differ-
ence in value in cash. Employee stock op-
tions typically have a vesting period during
which the employee may not exercise the
options. If he leaves the firm during
the vesting period the option is usually
forfeited. After the vesting period, the
options become American call options
and may be exercised whenever the em-
ployee finds it advantageous to do so,
though again they may be forfeited if
the employee leaves the firm, or may
expire unexecuted.
The theory behind granting options to
employees is that an employee who stands
Employee stock options
represent a real wealth
transfer from the firm to the
employees at the expense
of other stockholders.to profit personally when share prices in-
crease will work harder to ensure that this
comes about.3 At first firms simply gave
employees stock or loans with which to
buy stock. However, in 1993 Congress
passed a law limiting the tax deductibili-
ty of compensation to $1 million per ex-
ecutive. Stock grants were included in
the applicable forms of compensation.
Stock options, however, were not. Options,
which give the manager the same upside
potential as holding stock (though not
the same downside risk), were seen as an
ideal substitute, because their account-
ing impact was much less than outright
stock grants, if they were expensed at all.
In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board
(APB), the predecessor of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB),
which today sets generally accepted ac-
counting standards, issued Opinion 25,
mandating that employee stock options
should be expensed at their intrinsic
value at the time of issue. The intrinsic
value is the difference between the strike
price and the current market price of
the stock. No follow-up reporting was
required (except for stock appreciation
rights, which companies have to mark-
to-market by reporting changes in their
intrinsic value). Firms responded by sim-
ply granting stock options with a strike
price at or slightly above the current
market price, so that no expense need-
ed to be recognized.
Because companies found it easy to cir-
cumvent APB 25, several initiatives were
started to mandate the consistent expens-
ing of stock options, though without re-
sult. Financial Accounting Standard
(FAS) 123, issued by FASB in October
1995 suggested, but did not require, that
companies expense the fair value (what
the option is theoretically worth) of stock
options at time of issuance. FAS 123 pro-
vided guidance on determination of fair
value and suggested improved disclosure,
in footnotes, of details of executive stock
options issued (number) and exercised
(value). FAS 148, issued in 2002, required
standardized fair value expensing in
footnotes for newly issued options.
In response to recent scandals, a num-
ber of companies that had not previously
expensed their employee stock options
have begun to do so voluntarily, though
most remain opposed to mandating the
disclosure. In 2002, the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is-
sued a draft proposal for “Accounting
for Share-Based Payments” that requires
employee stock options to be expensed
at fair value at time of issue (comment
period ends March 7, 2003). And FASB
has issued a comparison of FAS 123 and
the IASB proposal with a call for com-
ments preliminary to considering
whether it should propose changes in
U.S. accounting standards (comment
period ended February 1, 2003).
The arguments against
Arguments against expensing stock op-
tions include the following:
• Firms that make heavy use of stock
options, particularly high-tech firms,
fear that expensing options will de-
press or wipe out their (reported)
earnings, perhaps making it more
difficult to raise external funds.
• The value of stock options is depen-
dent (in part) on the stock price.
Therefore, accounting for stock
options expense will introduce vola-
tility into (reported) earnings.
• There is no agreed method for valu-
ing stock options; therefore, the re-
ported options expenses could be
inconsistent and may be subject to
manipulation.
These arguments do not claim that op-
tions have no real value, rather that ex-
pensing them is problematic. Others
claim that options do not constitute a
bona fide expense.
Employee stock options do not fit the
usual definition of an expense—the ulti-
mate transaction, which occurs only if the
option is eventually exercised, is the sale
of stock. How can that be an expense?
• Stock options only affect the equity
portion of the balance sheet, and
therefore do not impact the opera-
tions of the firm.
• It is necessary only to account for
the possible dilution (increase in
shares outstanding) from issuance
of new shares to employees when
they exercise—implying that the
price at which the firm sells new
shares is unimportant.
Arguments that stock options have no
effect on the value of the firm are incor-
rect. As I show below, a firm’s financial
condition changes when stock options are
exercised. This affects future profitability
and thus indirectly the stock price. Those
who argue that what happens to the share-
holders’ wealth is immaterial to the fi-
nancial accounts of the firm ignore the
purpose of having the accounting done
in the first place.
Economic impact of employee
stock options
To understand the economic effects, con-
sider the following example: Assume a
company with five shares outstanding,
trading at $80. The employee has a stock
option for one share at a strike price of
$50. For regular stock options, the firm
has a choice of issuing new shares or pur-
chasing old shares to resell to the exec-
utive. For an SAR, the transactions that
take place at exercise are predetermined.
Two methods have identical effects on the
firm’s balance sheet, income, and stock
performance. The firm either pays the
employee $30 directly or purchases a
share of stock for $80 and sells it to the
employee for $50, leaving shares outstand-
ing at five and reducing the firm’s assets
(and the book value of equity) by $30.
The reduction in assets can be expected
to reduce future income and so future
earnings per share. If not fully antici-
pated prior to the exercise of the option,
the stock price is likely to decline to re-
flect the reduced value of the pro rata
claim on assets and earnings.4
The effect of the third method of exer-
cising employee stock options on the gen-
eral stockholder, the sale of new shares
to the employee at the strike price, is
more subtle. The sale in this instance in-
crease assets; however, it also increases
the number of shares outstanding. To
see that the general stockholder is worse
off, consider the alternative of selling
the new share in the market. The mar-
ket would value the new share and re-
value the old ones based on its assessment
of the firm’s ability to invest the proceeds
profitably. If the firm was expected to
make as good use of the new equity as
it has of the old, the value of the firm
would increase commensurate with the
increase in outstanding shares, and the
stock price should be unaffected (remain
at $100). However, in selling the employ-
ee the stock at only $50, the firm value
would increase less than the increase in
the number of shares and, therefore,
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These examples show that the exercise of
employee stock options invariably in-
volves a loss of value for stockholders and
is thus a transfer of wealth from stock-
holders to the employee.5 Of course, the
loss may be less than was expected at the
time the option was issued and the re-
sulting increased effort the executive
expends on their behalf may more than
compensate for the potential loss in value
at the time of exercise. Or it may not. If
the stockholders properly anticipate these
effects, the stock price will first respond
at the time the option is issued instead
of when it is exercised and will adjust as
the potential loss in the value of their
claims on the firm’s assets and net earn-
ings changes. To facilitate this, accounting
statements need to contain information
that will let investors assess the potential
loss in value embedded in stock options
that have been granted but not yet ex-
ercised. Without this information, they
cannot value their own claim on the firm
or monitor the executives’ compensation.
It is also desirable for the value of out-
standing options to be reflected on the
balance sheet, so that the book value
of the stockholders’ equity is minimally
impacted by the event.
How are employee options valued?
The most straightforward solution is the
least likely to be adopted: Firms could
simply purchase stock options from third
parties and give them to their employees.
This would involve a one-time, certain
cost. If the options were exercised, the
costs would accrue to the option writers
and not to the firm and its shareholders.
This would, of course, involve a cash out-
lay at the time of the option was issued
(purchased). That this form of employ-
ee stock option is not widely adopted
reveals something of the motive behind
their current usage—to transfer value
to the employee without the appear-
ance of an actual expenditure.
Because employee stock options are
not traded, their valuation necessarily
depends on models. The Black–Scholes
and binomial models are the most com-
mon.6 The theoretical value depends on
a number of factors, some of which are
unambiguous (strike price, current stock
price, expiry date, vesting date); some
of which are relatively unimportant (in-
terest rate); and several of which are both
important and difficult to measure (stock
price volatility and probability of vest-
ing), opening the potential for mispric-
ing and manipulation.
A normal option is usually worth more
than its intrinsic value. Options that have
not yet vested are worth somewhat less
than a vested option, though how much
less depends entirely on how likely the
employee is to leave.7 Adjusting for the
possibility of forfeiture of options before
they vest may reduce the theoretical
value of unvested options below their
intrinsic value. Similarly, if the employee
would lose any vested, but unexercised,
options upon leaving the firm, the val-
ue of his option will be less than it would
if he could keep it upon leaving, though
in this case the forced-exercise-adjusted
value would still exceed the intrinsic value.
While the valuation of options is fraught
with ambiguities, I note two facts: First,
the ambiguities become smaller as time
passes and eventually disappear; and,
second, ignoring the complexities of
vesting and forced-exercise results in
valuation that is conservative (i.e., high-
er). The convergence of theoretical value
to (the observable) intrinsic value over
time means that modeling errors are
much less important if options are both
expensed at issuance and then marked-
to-model over time. Over time, the errors
in estimating original option expense
and subsequent gains and losses to out-
standing options will cancel out.8
Accounting and economics
Employee stock options involve two eco-
nomic considerations that accounting
is ill equipped to deal with: opportunity
cost and contingencies. Opportunity cost
involves the counter-factual “what might
have been.” Consider the simple example
of the sale of an asset for more than its
book value but less than its market val-
ue. Since the asset is on the books at its
book value, rather than true value, the
transaction would appear as a gain or
positive income. What is economically
important is the market value of the as-
set, not its book value, so the firm is worse,
not better off. The stockholders would
not be pleased if they were made aware
of the transaction, and if the sale was to
an executive it might be considered im-
proper, if not illegal. The same informa-
tional problem applies to employee stock
options; by definition they are designed
to sell something for less than their
market price (unless it is an SAR). Ac-
counting also fails to see unissued or re-
purchased shares of the firm’s stock as
having value. When such shares are sold,
either to the market or to an employee,
there is no accounting benchmark for
reporting whether an economic gain
or loss was made on the sale.
Contingencies are “might be’s.” Employ-
ee stock options contain several contin-
gencies: the employee might leave and
forfeit the option before it vests; the
stock price may or may not go above
the strike price; the employee may be
forced to exercise early. FASB suggests,
and IASB mandates, that vesting be han-
dled by amortizing the initial fair value
of the option over the vesting period,
the idea being that the employee “earns”
a proportion of the option during each
intervening period. This ignores the fact
that the option is not earned continuous-
ly, but all at once when the employee
completes the stipulated period of ser-
vice. However, the contingent (on the
employee staying with the firm) liability
is created when the options are issued.
The possibility of forced exercise is han-
dled by using “expected exercise date”
rather than “expiry date” as an input to
valuation models—an ad hoc adjustment
that has little or no basis in option pricing
theory, and one that replaces a known
quantity with a subjective guess and serves
only to reduce the reported value.
Other types of contingencies, e.g., bank
loans that may or may not be paid

































































































































contra-accounts or reserves to capture
the estimated loan defaults or returns.
Since the gross loans or sales are rela-
tively unambiguous and the offsets are
clearly subjective (and subject to ma-
nipulation), the reader of these accounts
is able to differentiate between the more
and the less reliable components of in-
formation. Similarly, an employee may
or may not forfeit their options before,
and may or may not be forced to exercise
after they vest. If the accounting treat-
ment consisted of a straight (American)
option model value and then an offset-
ting adjustment for estimated forfeitures
and forced exercise, the reader could
see the full potential value, as well as
the firm’s “best guess” of the value of
the offsetting contingencies. This leaves
one big uncertainty: the volatility input
to the option valuation model. The eas-
iest way to eliminate manipulation of
this crucial number is to require a stan-
dard number be used, e.g., the Chicago
Board Options Exchange’s implied volatil-
ity index (VIX), allowing managers to re-
port alternative estimates in the footnotes.
Conclusion
The exercise of stock options involves
a loss of value to the stockholder, just as
real as the gain to the executive or em-
ployee. Outstanding stock options repre-
sent a liability to the firm in the economic
sense, if not the usual accounting sense.
This liability represents a senior claim on
the firm’s assets and a potentially important
component of managers’ compensation.
Transparency is therefore important. To
achieve transparency, ensure compara-
bility across firms, and reduce the scope
for manipulation, the aggregate fair value
of outstanding employee stock options
should be reported on the balance sheet
in as straightforward a manner as possi-
ble, with clearly differentiated “reserves”
for forfeitures and forced exercises. This
fair value could be accompanied (in
footnotes) by information concerning
the potential dilution represented by
outstanding options. Firms that wished
to offer non-standard models or inputs
(e.g., volatility assumptions) could do
so in footnotes.
Newly issued options should be expensed
at fair value, as should changes in the val-
ue of outstanding options, since these rep-
resent ongoing gains and loss of value to
stockholders. Then, the choice of model
becomes a secondary consideration—
over time any model errors will self-cor-
rect. Any hedges to reduce the risk
associated with employee stock options
should be similarly expensed and marked-
to-market. Properly constructed, hedg-
es can reduce the volatility associated with
marking-to-market outstanding options,
but they are not costless and they cannot
eliminate the value transfer associated
with the initial grants. To enable stock-
holders to monitor executives, the fair
value of new option awards and aggregate
outstanding options (vested and unvest-
ed) of senior executives should be not-
ed in footnotes. The IASB proposals
are a positive step in this direction.
1 For concision, I use the term “employee stock
options” to mean both executive and non-
executive stock options. The accounting issues
are the same, though the corporate gover-
nance issues differ.
2 By general stockholder, I mean an outside
stockholder who is not able to participate
in the stock option plan.
3 Recent cases such as Enron and WorldCom
have shown that this also produces an incen-
tive for fraudulent misrepresentations of the
firm’s condition to drive up the share price,
something not anticipated in the theory.
4 While the general stockholder may be indif-
ferent between a cash-paid SAR and stock
purchase and resale, the employee is not.
The employee’s preference depends on tax-
es and whether he can sell the share at the
pre-exercise price.
5 Hedging the value of the option may produce
offsetting cash flows at the time of exercise.
It is doubtful, however, that a perfect hedge
could be constructed given the forfeiture and
forced-exercise contingencies embedded in
employee stock options, or that a hedge would
be costless. In any case, hedging an asset or
liability is not usually considered a valid
reason for not reporting it.
6 The details are unimportant. The binomial
model is more flexible in handling vesting
periods and forced exercise due to termina-
tion of employment.
7 This is unlikely to be reliably reported in
financial statements.
8 The FASB proposal to modify FAS 123 con-
cerns only expensing of options at issuance
using fair value, so initial valuation errors
will not disappear. The IASB, on the other
hand, proposes accounting for changes in
the value of outstanding options as well as
expensing newly issued options.